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Outpost
The Dominion of Canada’s Colonial Garrison in 
Manitoba, 1870 to 1877 
DAVID GREBSTAD
Abstract : Military garrisons were a common requirement of empires, 
ancient or modern, in order to secure and maintain their imperial 
authority in colonies. Nineteenth century Canada was no different. When 
the Dominion of Canada annexed the North-Western interior of North 
America in 1870, it acquired a peripheral colony to be exploited by the 
economic, political, and cultural metropole of central Canada. Between 
1870-1877, the Dominion maintained a garrison of Active Militia in what 
is now Winnipeg to pre-empt external aggression, bring order to the 
frontier, and conduct policing duties in the rough and tumble nascent 
Province of Manitoba.
Military garrisons were a common requirement of empires, ancient or modern, in order to secure and maintain their 
imperial authority in colonies. The British Empire was no different as 
throughout the modern period, but most especially in the nineteenth 
century, the British maintained an expansive network of garrisons to 
secure their colonies around the world. British colonial garrisons were 
deployed haphazardly throughout the latter half of the eighteenth 
century, and then with more determination and order as the British 
imperium spread after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. By the mid-
nineteenth century, however, the rising cost of these garrisons worried 
British political leadership, and by the 1860’s there was a determined 
cry in the corridors of Whitehall and Westminster to reduce the 
expensive imperial footprint. By 1871, save for strategically vital 
points such as Esquimalt, Halifax and Gibraltar, the British legions 
were called home. Importantly, as the British imperial footprint 
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receded, the imperial aspirations of the Dominion of Canada in the 
North-American continental interior increased. 
When the Dominion of Canada annexed the North-Western 
interior of North America in 1870, it acquired a peripheral colony to be 
exploited by the economic, political, and cultural metropole of central 
Canada.1 As its ancient and contemporary imperial confrères had 
done, Canada was required to deploy a military garrison in order to 
achieve key military objectives. The three military-strategic objectives 
of these garrisons were articulated by historian Peter Burroughs in 
the Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History thusly: pre-
empting external aggression by foreign powers; bringing order to 
unstable or lawless frontiers, and conducting internal or policing 
duties.2 Although the young Dominion Government had hoped the 
British would provide this service, the political leadership in London, 
who were bent on centralizing the army at home, steadfastly refused. 
Consequently, between 1870 and 1877 the Dominion government 
maintained a colonial garrison of Canadian Active Militia soldiers in 
the Red River Settlement.3 
Lamentably, the story of the Dominion military force on service 
in Manitoba is practically unknown as very little historical rigour 
has been directed towards it.4 Little is known of its constitution, its 
actions, what life on the frontier was like or how the force served to 
establish and maintain Canadian authority in the region. The aim of 
1  For an excellent historical summary of how the established provinces of the 
Dominion of Canada treated the North-West as a colony with natural-resources to 
exploit, see Mary Janigan, Let the Eastern Bastards Freeze in the Dark: The West 
versus the Rest since Confederation, (Toronto: Knopf, 2012).
2  Peter Burroughs, “Imperial Defence and the Victorian Army,” The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 15, no. 1 (July 2008), 58.
3  Although known as Winnipeg today, several terms were used interchangeably to 
refer to the region which has since been subsumed by the City of Winnipeg. The 
Red River Settlement included a number of parishes along the Red and Assiniboine 
Rivers. Fort Garry, also known as Upper Fort Garry to differentiate it from another 
fort further north near Selkirk, Manitoba, was the Hudson’s Bay Company post near 
the forks of those two rivers, and the village of Winnipeg was one of the parishes 
of the Red River Settlement, lying just north of Fort Garry. Contemporaries often 
used these terms interchangeably, particularly when the village of Winnipeg grew so 
exponentially after 1870, eventually geographically dominating the local area.
4  There are some important exceptions. See George Francis Gillman. Stanley, Toil 
& Trouble: Military Expeditions to Red River  (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1989) 
and Frederic Shore’s unpublished doctoral thesis for the University of Manitoba 
The Canadians and the Métis: The Re-creation of Manitoba, 1858-1872. (Ottawa: 
National Library of Canada, 1993.)
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this article is to rectify this situation and fill a regrettable gap in the 
narrative of Canadian military history. It will do so by first providing 
a brief historical sketch of the creation, deployment and changing 
characteristics of the Dominion garrison in Winnipeg from 1870 to 
1877. Afterwards, it will illustrate how this garrison achieved the very 
same strategic military objectives of British imperial garrisons during 
the height of the British Empire, namely as a military deterrent to 
external aggressors, a force to stabilize the frontier for settlement, and 
in the provision of law and order. Finally, it will illustrate the more 
nefarious aspects of the militia garrison, particularly the soldiers’ 
racial and culturally-motivated violence against Métis inhabitants of 
the region. In so doing, this article should shed some light on an 
unfortunately neglected, yet interesting and important, chapter in 
Canadian military history.
the red river expedition
The story of the Canadian garrison in Manitoba cannot be considered 
without reference to the singular event that caused its creation, the 
Red River Resistance of 1869-70. The resistance is itself an historical 
event of great importance to Canadian history, too complex to be 
discussed in detail here. That notwithstanding, a brief survey of 
how the Resistance led to Canadian annexation is important to 
contextualize the deployment of the garrison to Manitoba.
The history of the North-West predates European contact by 
millennia, inhabited as it was by Indigenous peoples for centuries 
before the first European explorers and traders penetrated the heart 
of the continent. Europeans arrived in the region in the seventeenth 
century, and immediately recognized the commercial value of the 
region’s natural resources, particularly its furs. In 1670, the Hudson’s 
Bay Company formed in London and received a royal charter from 
the British government for exclusive trading authority in the Hudson’s 
Bay watershed, a region known to Europeans as Rupert’s Land. The 
Hudson’s Bay Company was joined in the exploitation of the region’s 
natural resources by other trading companies, such as the Montreal-
based North-West Company and the XY Company, also known as the 
New North-West Company. The latter two companies joined forces 
in 1805, and eventually merged with the Hudson’s Bay Company in 
1821 after much acrimony and violence. After 1821, the Hudson’s Bay 
3
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Company became the de facto, and to a degree the de jure, colonial 
authority in the North-West.
In addition to fur traders, Thomas Douglas, 5th Earl of Selkirk, 
also known simply as Lord Selkirk, established a colony of Scottish 
emigres in the Red River Valley in 1811 on land granted him by the 
Hudson’s Bay Company, near where the city of Winnipeg is currently 
situated. The Red River Settlement, as it came to be known, was 
soon the focal point of the entire North-West in the early nineteenth 
century due to the presence of both the Selkirk settlement and the 
principal Hudson’s Bay Company Trading Post at Fort Garry, both 
situated near the confluence of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers. 
Unsurprisingly, the European settlers chose a location that had been 
a traditional Indigenous meeting and trading location for centuries. 
By the late 1860s, we find that the area of the Red River Settlement 
was a sparsely populated yet culturally pluralistic conglomeration 
of Indigenous peoples, French and English Métis, descendants of 
Selkirk’s Scottish emigres, Canadian immigrants, and Hudson’s Bay 
Company officials and traders. 
In the mid-nineteenth century the financial fortunes of the 
Hudson’s Bay Company began to wane, and Canadian interest in 
acquiring the North-West for exploitation increased. Late nineteenth 
century explorations and surveys of the North-West revealed that 
“The Great Lone Land,” as it was termed by British soldier and 
explorer William Butler, may have been in many ways devoid of 
activity, but it was nonetheless full of potential.5 Curious about the 
economic and resource possibilities in the region, in the 1850s the 
Province of Canada6 and the British Government each funded their 
own exploratory expeditions to determine if the North-West was 
suitable for settlement. The two reports produced mixed reviews. 
While the British survey was tepid in its assessment of the North-
West’s potential, the Canadian expedition concluded that the region 
held enough economic promise that it was indeed worthy of annexation 
and settlement.7 It is likely for this reason that when the Fathers 
5  Capt. William F. Butler, The Great Lone Land: A Narrative of Travel and Adventure 
in the North-West of America (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, Low, & Searle, 1873).
6  Between 1840 and 1867 the Province of Canada included what is now known as the 
provinces of Ontario and Quebec.
7  See Henry Youle Hind, Narrative of the Canadian Red River Exploring Expedition 
of 1857 and of the Assiniboine and Saskatchewan Exploring Expedition of 1858 
(London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1860).
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of Confederation met at the 1864 Quebec Conference to discuss 
possible Confederation, they included in their 72 Resolutions a clause 
specifically targeted at keeping the door to annexation of the North-
West open.8 Additionally, when Confederation was achieved three 
years later, section 146 of the British North America Act provided 
for the eventual admission of Rupert’s Land into Confederation.9
When it became apparent that it would be in the best interest 
of the Honourable Company to relinquish control of Rupert’s Land, 
and that Canada was willing to bring the lands into the Dominion, 
a transfer to the Crown was eventually arranged for 1 December 
1869, with a transfer to the Dominion to occur sometime thereafter. 
Importantly, no one bothered to consult with the inhabitants who 
understandably took umbrage at being traded off like chattel. When 
the Lieutenant-Governor-designate, the Dominion Minister of Public 
Works and long-time annexation advocate William McDougall, 
arrived at the Hudson’s Bay Post at Pembina near the international 
border south of Red River on 30 October 1869, he was met there by 
a representative of the Métis National Committee, an organization 
formed by Métis in Red River, who bade him not to enter the 
territory of the North-West without the committee’s authorization.10 
This single act put a stop to the peaceful and orderly transferral of 
the region to the Dominion. 
Fort Garry and its stores were seized; a pro-Canada counter-
resistance was organized and failed, its adherents imprisoned; 
and eventually the Provisional Government of Assiniboia with 
representation from English and French Parishes was assembled with 
Louis Riel as its President. Thomas Scott, a bellicose Orangeman 
and staunch pro-Canada advocate who had come to the North West 
as part of the Dawson Road labour force, was executed by firing 
squad at Riel’s order on 4 March 1870. Scott’s execution became 
the cassus belli for many Anglophone Protestants in Ontario and 
8  Early Canadiana Online Website, “Resolution 10” Report of Resolutions adopted 
at a Conference of Delegates from the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New 
Brunswick, and the Colonies of Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, held at the 
City of Quebec, October 10, 1864, as the Basis of a proposed confederation of those 
Provinces and Colonies, http://eco.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.9_01325/1?r=0&s=1, 
(accessed 14 November 2018). 
9  British North America Act, 1867, 30&31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.)
10  “Letter from William McDougall to The Honourable Secretary of State for 
the Provinces” dated 31 October 1869 in Correspondence Relative to the Recent 
Disturbances in the Red River Settlement, (London: William Clowes & Sons, 1870), 4.
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amongst the militia volunteers who subsequently deployed to Red 
River. The resistance eventually ended when representatives of the 
Provisional Government provided their list of rights and demands to 
Dominion representatives in Ottawa, resulting in the Manitoba Act, 
which created the Province of Manitoba in May of 1870 and which 
was later ratified by the Provisional Government at Fort Garry.
Almost from the outset of the resistance, a military response 
was contemplated. Indeed, contracts for the construction of the boats 
necessary to convey a force though the rivers and lakes between 
Thunder Bay and Fort Garry and orders to improve the corduroy 
road leading North West of the former were issued as early as 
January 1870.11 Although initially cool to the idea of suppressing 
the resistance by force, interest amongst the political leadership in 
Ottawa in the deployment of a military force increased exponentially 
once word of Scott’s execution arrived in Ontario.12 Only five days 
after Scott’s execution, on 9 March 1870, the Governor General 
informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Earl Granville, that 
if troops were to be dispatched, they should begin movement in late 
April. Later, on 23 March 1870, in an early intimation of the expected 
role of the force in Manitoba, the Colonial Office informed the War 
Office that the British General Officer Commanding in British North 
America, Lieutenant-General James Lindsay, might be required to 
despatch to the Red River Territory “a detachment not exceeding 
200 infantry and a small force of artillery, in company with a larger 
body of Canadians, to maintain order in that settlement during 
the process of its annexation to Canada [emphasis added].”13 This 
observation, coupled with the fact that the War Office was insistent 
that British regular forces would be withdrawn in the fall of 1871, 
11  Simon Dawson, Report of the Red River Expedition of 1870, (Ottawa: Times 
Printing and Publishing Co., 1871), 6.
12  “Copy of a Report of a Committee of the Honorable the Privy Council, dated 16th 
December, 1869,” Correspondence and Papers connected with recent occurrences in 
the North-West Territories, (Ottawa: I.B. Taylor, 1870), 143.
13  Early Canadiana Online Website, “Letter from the Colonial Office to the War 
Office dated 23 March 1870,” The War Office to Lieutenant-General the Honourable 
James Lindsay, http://eco.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.91209/2?r=0&s=1, (accessed 
14 November 2018).
6
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indicates that the use of Canadian Militia as a form of colonial 
garrison was contemplated even before the force was assembled.14 
In April, rumours about a possible expedition to the North-West 
were circulating amongst the ranks of the militia.15 Militia General 
Orders of 12 May 1870 listed the officers who had been selected to 
proceed to Red River as part of the Red River Expeditionary Force. 
This brigade was a combined force composed of a British Regular 
Battalion, the 1st Battalion 60th Rifles, supported by a troop of 
British artillery and a small force of British engineers. The Canadian 
contingent consisted of two ad-hoc battalions of Canadian Militia 
volunteers from Active Militia Corps in Ontario and Quebec, styled 
the 1st Ontario Rifles and 2nd Quebec Rifles respectively.16 These 
two militia battalions became the colonial proto-garrison of the post-
Confederation North-West.17
A moment should be taken here to investigate the Canadian 
militia system from which these two battalions derived. The structure 
of this system was articulated in May 1868 in An Act respecting the 
Militia and Defence of the Dominion of Canada (hereafter the 
Militia Act 1868). The Canadian Militia was organized into two 
divisions: the Active and Reserve Militia. The former referred to 
volunteers who joined local militia corps and drilled regularly. In 
1870, the Active Militia numbered 40,000 men. The Reserve Militia, 
conversely, consisted of all the men of the country not exempted 
from service due to age, profession or family status, who were not 
members of the Active Militia and did not parade or train. They 
simply represented the country’s population liable to service in a 
levée en masse in the event of emergency, estimated in 1870 to 
number 675,000 men.18
The head and Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian Militia was, 
and remains to this day, the Governor General while the responsibility 
14  Early Canadiana Online Website, “Letter from the War Office to the 
Lieutenant General Lindsay dated 24 March 1870,” The War Office to Lieutenant-
General the Honourable James Lindsay, http://eco.canadiana.ca/view/
oocihm.91209/2?r=0&s=1, (accessed 14 November 2018). 
15  “From Montreal” The Volunteer Review, 4, no. 15, (11 April 1870), 230.
16  Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Militia General Orders (17) No. 1, 
12 May 1870.
17  It should be noted that this was not the first military force sent to Red River to 
conduct colonial garrison duties. See Stanley’s Toil and Trouble for a comprehensive 
history of the British garrisons that spent time in Red River. 
18  Ibid., 10-11.
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to administer the militia fell to Minister of Militia and Defence.19 The 
Adjutant-General was the senior military officer responsible to the 
Minister for the military administration of the Militia.20 In 1874, 
the Dominion Government decided to create the position of General 
Officer Commanding, and in 1875 Briton Sir Edward Selby Smyth was 
named the General Officer Commanding of the Canadian Militia.21 
Administratively, the militia was divided into military districts. In 
1870, nine military districts were in existence and each commanded 
by a Deputy Adjutant-General with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.22 
Returning now to the Red River Expeditionary Force, volunteers 
were assembled for a term of service of one year. By mid-May the 
force mustered at the Crystal Palace in Toronto where they were 
drilled, received their uniforms and equipment, and underwent 
medical examinations. On 21 May the expedition’s commander, 
British Colonel Garnet Wolseley, moved to Collingwood on Georgian 
Bay with a vanguard of British regulars and arranged for the force to 
be transported by steamship to Thunder Bay. In the weeks following 
the force’s arrival in in Thunder Bay, it built a corduroy road from 
Thunder Bay to Shebandowan Lake and thereafter it executed a 
herculean task by making its way by canoe and portage to Fort 
Garry via the Precambrian morass of muskeg, rock, and lakes that is 
northwestern Ontario. The lead elements of British regulars arrived 
at Fort Garry in a driving rain on the morning of 24 August 1870. 
Despite the overtures that the expedition was a “peacekeeping” 
19  Militia Act, 31 Victoria, c. 40 (Canada), s. 1&2 (1868).
20  “Militia Report 1870” National Defence Directorate of History and Heritage 
(DHH), 2019, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/mili-rep/
Militia-Report-1870.pdf, (accessed January 25).
21  Stephen Harris, Canadian Brass: The Growth of the Canadian Military Profession 
1860-1919. (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1980), 47. The position 
of General Officer Commanding remained in effect until 1904 when it was replaced 
by the new office of Chief of the General Staff.
22  Militia Act (1868), s. 12. Four in Ontario, three in Quebec, and one each in 
New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. If large enough, districts were further sub-divided 
into Brigade Divisions, and they into Regimental Divisions which were in turn sub-
divided into Company Divisions. The purpose of the Brigade/Regimental/Company 
divisions was to maintain an up to date nominal roll of the reserve militia in the 
district, in order to facilitate the mobilization of the population in the event of an 
emergency. To maintain the reserve rolls, Regimental Divisions had appointed to 
them one Lieutenant-Colonel and two Majors, all members of the Reserve Militia, 
while Company Divisions were appointed a Captain and two sub-officers of the 
Reserve Militia. 
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force, and the fact that the resistance had all but ended with the 
unanimous ratification of the Manitoba Act by the Legislative 
Assembly of Assiniboia three months prior, the 60th Rifles deployed 
in order of battle.  As they advanced on the Fort, they discovered 
that Louis Riel and his principal lieutenants had, wisely, fled the 
scene. Two days later, the first elements of the Canadian militia 
volunteers arrived and settled down to garrison the newest provincial 
capital in the Dominion. By 2 September, Colonel Wolseley and the 
British Regulars had departed, en route to Ontario and thence home 
to the United Kingdom. Command of the Dominion colonial garrison 
in the North-West devolved to Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Jarvis, 
Commanding Officer of the 1st Ontario Rifles.23 
seven years in the north-west
The Canadian garrison in Red River spent the next seven years 
representing Dominion authority in the newly acquired territory. 
Throughout its tenure, the size and organization of the Dominion 
forces in Manitoba waxed and waned, influenced by local security 
circumstances and, as ever, federal fiscal realities. After its first year 
of garrison duty, the Adjutant-General in Ottawa, British Colonel 
Patrick Robertson-Ross, decided to reduce the size of the force in 
Manitoba, noting the imminent termination of the volunteers’ terms 
of service, and stating in his annual report that “the necessity ... 
for maintaining, under arms, so large a force in that Province no 
longer exists (the peaceful solution of all difficulties there having [as 
expected] been happily realized).”24
Consequently, the garrison was reduced in size from 862 to 89 
– four officers and eighty-five men, under the command of Major 
Acheson G. Irvine.25 In addition to his decision to reduce the force, 
Colonel Robertson-Ross made a number of other recommendations 
to the Minister of Militia concerning the defence of Manitoba, the 
23  For a detailed account of the Red River Expedition see G.L. Huyshe, The Red 
River Expedition, (London: Macmillan and Co., 1871). Captain Huyshe was a staff 
officer to Colonel Garnet Wolseley during the expedition.
24  “Militia Report, 1870” DND DHH Website, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/
dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/mili-rep/Militia-Report-1870.pdf, 31 (accessed 24 January 
2019).
25  Ibid., 38.
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most important being his suggestion that a new military district, 
Number 10, should be created in the Province of Manitoba. His 
recommendation was subsequently approved by Order-in-Council on 
19 January 1871.26 Despite the early approval of his recommendation, 
orders from Militia Headquarters to create Military District No. 10 
were not published until October 1871. 
The eighty-nine militiamen who remained in the garrison were 
volunteers from the original force who agreed to be retained for at 
least another six months, with the possibility of extending the terms 
for a further six months as determined by the Commanding Officer. 
Those of the original expedition desirous of discharge were offered a 
grant of land equal to 160 acres in Manitoba, or transportation back 
to the military district of their enrolment.27 The discharge began in 
earnest in May and culminated in June 1871.28 
As the ranks of the militia defenders in Fort Garry thinned, 
foreboding martial clouds gathered. In 1871, Ottawa received word 
of a possible Fenian incursion into Manitoba and preparations for 
the defence of the new province were undertaken. The Order-in-
Council that authorized the creation of Military District No. 10 of 
January 1871 was finally enforced in Militia General Orders (23) 
of 16 October 1871. In the same order, Lieutenant-Colonel William 
Osborne Smith, Deputy Adjutant-General of Military District No. 
5 (Montreal, Quebec) was designated the new Deputy Adjutant-
General of Military District No. 10. Additionally, even though only 
four months had passed since the reduction of the force in Manitoba, 
Militia General Orders (23) called for volunteers for a second Red 
River Expeditionary Force to augment the eighty-nine members 
of the garrison in Fort Garry.29 Captain Thomas Scott of Perth, 
Ontario was selected to command this expedition which consisted of 
275 officers and men, drawn again from Ontario and Quebec Active 
Militia corps.30 
26  Ibid., 32.
27  Manitoba News Letter, “Discharge of Volunteers,” 27 May 1871, 2.
28  “Militia Report 1871,” National Defence DHH, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.
gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/mili-rep/Militia-Report-1871.pdf (accessed 25 
January 2019).
29  “Militia General Orders (23) dated 16 October 1871” The Canada Gazette, 5, no. 
17, (21 October 1871): 1.
30  “Militia Report, 1871” DND DHH Website, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/
dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/mili-rep/Militia-Report-1871.pdf,  40 (accessed 25 
January 2019).
10
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The Fenian threat of October 1871 sputtered out quickly when a 
U.S. Cavalry force rounded up the invading ‘army’ after it pillaged 
the Hudson’s Bay Company Fort at Pembina. The Second Red River 
Expedition arrived on 18 November, long after the Fenian threat had 
ended.31 Ironically, the whole of the officers of the Second Expedition, 
with the exception of one, were veterans of the First Expedition who 
had been discharged and sent home not long before.32 The Second 
Expedition merged with the remnants of the First and formed what 
thereafter was referred to as the Provisional Battalion of Infantry.33 
In the spring of 1872, the terms of service for the First Red 
River Expedition men who had stayed on in Fort Garry and those 
who had come out in the Second Red River Expedition were nearing 
an end. Whereas the year previous the Adjutant-General had been 
anxious to reduce the size of the garrison in Manitoba, the recent 
Fenian unpleasantness convinced Robertson-Ross to authorize 
Osborne Smith to discharge the men whose terms of service were 
expiring, but only insofar as he could maintain the size of the force 
in Manitoba through local recruitment. Osborne Smith was also 
informed that, should he be unable to do so, reinforcements from the 
eastern provinces may be required.34 
There was an insufficient number of local recruits in Manitoba 
willing to join the ranks of the volunteers. Consequently, on 6 
September 1872, the Adjutant-General once again issued orders to 
the military districts to recruit volunteers for service in Manitoba. 
Two hundred more volunteers were sought from Active Militia corps 
31  Manitoba Liberal, “Arrival of the Troops” 19 November 1871, 3; Justus Griffin, 
From Toronto to Fort Garry. An account of the Second Expedition to Red River. 
Diary of a Private Solider, (Hamilton: Evening Times, 1893), 53.
32  “Militia Report, 1871” DND DHH Website, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/
dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/mili-rep/Militia-Report-1871.pdf, 40 (accessed 25 January 
2019).
33  The original name was the Provisional Battalion of Rifles, but was renamed to the 
Provisional Battalion of Infantry.
34  Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Correspondence of the General Officer 
Commanding (GOC) of the Canadian Militia and his predecessor, the Adjutant 
General, RG 9, “Correspondence from the Adjutant General of Militia to the Deputy 
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in Ontario and Quebec.35 Additionally, District 7 (Quebec City) was 
tasked to provide one officer, one sergeant and twenty-four Gunners 
from B Battery School of Gunnery at the Citadel.36 In the fall of 1872, 
this draft of men, the Third Red River Expeditionary Force, was 
dispatched to Fort Garry and arrived on 23 October. The Provisional 
Battalion of Infantry and the composite Artillery Battery became 
known, collectively, as the Dominion Forces on Service in Manitoba.37 
In a departure from previous terms of service, which were usually six 
months of enrolment with a liability for a further six months at the 
discretion of the Commanding Officer, this iteration of the terms of 
service were extended to one year with a liability for a further period 
of service not exceeding two years.  The elongated terms of service 
are indicative of the Dominion Government’s inclination to maintain 
a long-term garrison in Fort Garry.38 
In May of 1873, mere months after the arrival of the third 
expedition, Militia Headquarters in Ottawa advertised for a further 
156 volunteers to proceed to Manitoba. The plans for this, the Fourth 
Red River Expedition, coming hard on the heels of the arrival of the 
Third Red River Expedition was doubtless related to the fear of an 
Indigenous uprising that was pervasive in Manitoba in the spring of 
1873, and a question to which we will return to later. Whereas previous 
volunteers were drawn from Ontario and Quebec Active Militia corps, 
this draft of replacements came from the Maritime Provinces – fifty 
men each from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Additionally, fifty-
six more gunners split between B Battery and its sister organization, 
A Battery School of Gunnery in Kingston, Ontario, were dispatched 
35  LAC, Correspondence of the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Canadian 
Militia and his predecessor, the Adjutant General, RG 9, “Correspondence from 
Adjutant General of Militia to all Deputy Adjutant Generals” 6 September 1872, 
Series II B1, Volume 518. The quotas for the various districts were as follows: District 
1 (London) 25; District 2 (Toronto) 35; District 3 (Kingston) 20; District 4 (Ottawa) 
20; Districts 5 and 6 (Montreal and St. Jean) 66; and District 7 (Quebec City) 34.
36  Ibid.
37  Public Archives Manitoba, Journal of the Provisional Battalion of Rifles at Fort 
Garry, 1871 as found in James Taylor Collection, MG6, B5. The journal erroneously 
only refers to the 184 volunteers who were destined to join the Provisional Battalion 
of Rifles, and leaves out the 24 artillerymen from B Battery who formed the Dominion 
Artillery on Service in Manitoba. 
38  LAC, Correspondence of the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Canadian 
Militia and his predecessor, the Adjutant General, RG 9, “Correspondence from 
Adjutant General of Militia to all Deputy Adjutant Generals” 6 September 1872, 
Series II B1, Volume 518.
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to bolster the militia fire power in Winnipeg. The Fourth Expedition 
arrived in July 1873.
In 1874 the Active Militia underwent a nation-wide reduction 
from 40,000 to 30,000 which had a significant impact on the militia in 
Manitoba. In the fall of 1874, Militia Headquarters ordered Lieutenant-
Colonel Osborne Smith to reduce the size of the Dominion Forces in 
Manitoba. The Militia, having for four years provided deterrence and 
enforced law and order in the North-West, were replaced. The North-
West Mounted Police, which had been created the year previous in 
1873, assumed the preponderance of these duties.39 
Osborne Smith was authorized to offer discharging soldiers a 
gratuity of two months’ pay and a sum of money equivalent to the 
cost of transport to the volunteer’s original Military District. This led 
to a doubling of the number of men seeking discharge, and Osborne 
Smith was compelled to prioritize them based on their length of 
service and conduct.40 In his annual reports for the District in 1873 
and 1874, Osborne Smith reported that the number of Dominion 
Forces under his command was reduced from 344 to 200 personnel.41
While many of the duties of the Militia may have been taken 
over by the Mounties, the military force did not disappear overnight. 
On the contrary, the size and organization of the militia in Manitoba 
remained consistent for the next three years, with only slight 
variations in the number of men enrolled until June 1876 when Militia 
Headquarters ordered another reduction in size of the Dominion 
Forces in Manitoba. Although political leaders had hoped that the 
Militia volunteers would settle in Manitoba and thus provide a cohort 
of experienced soldiers to be called upon in emergencies, less than ten 
percent of the men released in 1876 chose to remain in the area.42 The 
majority took their land warrants home with them upon discharge, 
hoping to realize a greater profit in southern Ontario, given that 
39  Manitoba Free Press, “Military Here to Be Reduced,” 4 November 1874, 1.
40  “Militia Report 1874,” DND DHH Website, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/
dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/mili-rep/Militia-Report-1874.pdf, 51 (accessed 25 January 
2019).
41  “Militia Report 1873,” DND DHH Website, , http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/
dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/mili-rep/Militia-Report-1873.pdf, (accessed 25 January 
2019) and “Militia Report 1874” DND DHH Website, accessed 25 January 2019, 
http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/mili-rep/Militia-
Report-1874.pdf,.
42  Manitoba Free Press, “Dominion Forces in the North-West,” 20 July 1876, 4.
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speculators in Manitoba were offering much lower prices for the land 
warrants.43 
The 1876 reductions were the initial death throes of the colonial 
garrison in Manitoba. In May of 1877 the editors of the Manitoba 
Free Press lamented that “they [are] sorry to learn there is some 
foundation for the rumour which prevailed yesterday that the garrison 
of Canadian regular militia hitherto maintained here, and which has 
been looked upon as one of the institutions of the place, is likely to 
be abolished in the course of a few weeks.”44 There was surprisingly 
little delay between the official announcement of the disbandment of 
the regular garrison in May and the act itself. In August 1877, almost 
seven years to the day that the Canadian Militia arrived in Fort 
Garry, the Dominion’s colonial garrison in Manitoba was disbanded. 
the dominion’s strategic tool in the north-west
What was the impetus for the Dominion Government to keep this 
rather robust force on its colonial frontier? The logistical demands 
alone were a sufficient argument to dismiss the force at an early date. 
The force was isolated on the margins of colonized territory with no 
reliable line of communication between the political, popular, and 
economic power base of central Canada. As one settler put it, Fort 
Garry sat beyond the Ultima Thule of the civilized world.45 What 
role did this colonial outpost play?
A necessary precondition to answer that question is to understand 
the Dominion of Canada’s strategic intent in the North-West. In very 
simple terms, this intent was articulated in the joint address of 17 
December 1867 by the Canadian House of Commons and Senate sent 
to Queen Victoria. In it, the Canadian political leaders expressed their 
arguments for the joining of the Dominion with Rupert’s Land. The 
proffered list of benefits to be derived from such a transfer is lengthy, 
but throughout there is a common theme of pan-Imperial benefit. 
For example, the Canadian government suggested that annexation 
would “promote the prosperity of the Canadian people, and conduce 
to the advantage of the whole Empire … if [Canada’s authority] were 
43  Manitoba Free Press, ‘Local and Provincial’, 4 August 1877, 4.
44  Manitoba Free Press, “Expected Abolition of the Garrison,” 26 May 1877, 4.
45  Manitoba Free Press, “Music Hath Charms” 19 August 1876, 5.
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extended westward to the Pacific Ocean.” Additionally, they argued 
that the life of the British subjects living therein would be “materially 
enhanced by the formation therein of political institutions bearing 
analogy, as far as circumstances will admit, to those which exist in 
the several Provinces of this Dominion.”46 This last observation seems 
a thinly veiled reference to the threat of American republicanism and 
the inherent benefits of British constitutional monarchy. In short, 
the strategic intent of the Dominion of Canada was to annex to 
the North-West for its exploitation, and to preserve and enhance 
the British Empire with a trans-continental Dominion of Canada 
as a constituent element thereof. With these strategic goals as a 
foundation, this article now turns to the question of how the Dominion 
Government used this military force to achieve the three military 
objectives of colonial garrisons articulated by Peter Burroughs: pre-
empting foreign aggression, stabilizing the frontier, and providing law 
and order. 
pre-empting foreign aggression
A threat to the Canadian annexation of the North-West, at least 
as many contemporary Canadians saw it, was the ever-expanding 
United States, although in the end this threat was more bark than 
bite. American interest in annexing British North America was a 
constant theme from the end of the Revolutionary War.47 By the 
mid-nineteenth century, American and British/Canadian westward 
expansion resulted in their interests colliding to the west of the 
Great Lakes. 
American influence grew in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century as settlement of the American West increased. For example, 
in 1849 the territory of Minnesota was home to  only 5,000 people. By 
46  “Joint Address to Her Majesty the Queen from the Senate and House of Commons 
of Canada,” Copy and Extracts of Correspondence between the Colonial Office, the 
Government of the Canadian Dominion, and the Hudson’s Bay Company, relating 
to the Surrender of Rupert’s Land by the Hudson’s Bay Company, and for the 
Admission Thereof into the Dominion of Canada, (London: HM Stationary Office, 
1869), 1-2.
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1860 that number had grown to 172,000.48 Additionally, immigration 
from the western regions of the United States into the North-West 
increased substantially and many American settlers openly agitated 
for annexation by the United States.49 These influential changes in 
both the economic and demographic make-up of the North-West and 
the subsequent burgeoning influence of Minnesota and the American 
West threatened to pull the North-West into the American Republic.
Fortunately for Canada, the Civil War distracted American 
interest in the North-West, if only for a few years. When the war 
ended, tepid American interest in annexation resumed, emanating 
primarily from Minnesota. One of the most outspoken post-Civil 
War proponents of American expansion was Minnesota Senator 
Alexander Ramsey. To Senator Ramsey, the Red River Settlement 
was a spring-board to the North-West, the resources of which he 
envisioned providing a massive economic boon to his state.50 Senator 
Ramsey was not alone in his covetous thinking. While Ramsey was 
the dominant expansionist force in Minnesota, Charles Sumner, the 
chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was his equal in 
Washington. Sumner was extremely vocal in his support of the removal 
of British authority from North America.51 To illustrate, when the 
United States purchased Alaska in 1867, Sumner urged ratification of 
the purchase as he felt it was a crucial step to occupation of the whole 
of the North American continent.52
While a small group of American policy makers were supportive 
of annexation, the movement lacked broad political support. With 
the exception of peak periods of animosity, such as the War of 1812, 
Canada never figured prominently in the minds of the majority of 
American political leaders. When it did, the consensus was that 
time and inertia would inevitably draw Canada into the Republic.53 
However, if interest in American expansion into British North 
48  George F.G. Stanley, The Birth of Western Canada, A History of the Riel 
Rebellions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), 24.
49  Arthur S. Morton, A History of the Canadian West to 1870-71: Being a History 
of Rupert’s Land (the Hudson’s Bay Company’s Territory) and of the North-West 
Territory (including the Pacific Slope), (London: T. Nelson & Sons, 1939), 854.
50  Ibid., 696.
51  Charles P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: a History of Canadian External 
Policies, vol. 1, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 29.
52  David Orchard, The Fight for Canada: Four Centuries of Resistance to American 
Expansionism (Westmount: Robert Davies Multimedia Pub., 1999), 49.
53  Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 29
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America was lukewarm in the United States, the same could not be 
said of the angst amongst Canadian political leaders, whose fear of 
the Yankee Bogeyman was a persistent theme. Indeed, it seems there 
was more fear of American expansion in Canada than there was 
appetite for annexation in America. 
That said, Canada’s fears were not wholly without merit. American 
land purchases, annexations, and outright conquests in Texas, 
Mexico, and Alaska demonstrated the voracious appetite of American 
expansionism. Likewise, a series of Anglo-American treaties, such as 
the 1842 Weber-Ashburton Treaty and later the 1848 Oregon Treaty, 
revealed Great Britain’s willingness to appease American interests by 
ceding future Canadian territory in order to avoid potential conflict.54 
Additionally, the history of American incursions into Canada officially 
or by non-state actors in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, 
and during the Fenian invasions all contributed to a general sense 
of unease amongst Canadians about American intentions in British 
North America.
This mindset explains why the Red River Resistance of 1869-
1870 caused fits of concern amongst Canadian political leaders who 
worried the United States could exploit the situation to their benefit. 
Reports from Fort Garry that the resistance was taking a pro-
American bias increased the government’s appetite for dispatching 
an expeditionary force. Considering that Canada’s military power 
was less than impressive, and that the United States military, 
although demobilized after the Civil War, was large, well-armed, and 
battle-hardened, British involvement was considered a necessity for 
any sort of legitimate dissuasive effect to be realized.55 Sir John A. 
Macdonald stated this outright in a letter to the Governor General 
on 26 January 1870, writing that “it is of great importance that some 
of the force should be Regular Troops as it will convince the United 
States Government and people that Her Majesty’s Government has 
no intention of abandoning this continent.”56 Thus, from a military 
perspective, a joint Anglo-Canadian expedition was necessary for 
the realization of Canadian strategic goals, not only to potentially 
subdue the insurgents, but also to pre-empt the danger of American 
54  Ibid., 5.
55  Stanley, Toil and Trouble, 74.
56  Extract from a letter of Sir John A. Macdonald, 26 January 1870, as quoted in 
Stanley, The Birth of Western Canada, 129.
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interference.57 Fruitless efforts from the Dominion Government to 
convince the British to keep a regular garrison in Fort Garry meant 
that the only military deterrent available was a Canadian militia 
force. 
While the strength and quality of the garrison in Fort Garry was 
insufficient to defeat any concerted American invasion, it nonetheless 
existed as an overt symbol of Dominion authority. Moreover, the 
maintenance of a Dominion garrison in Fort Garry continued the 
British practice of deploying forces to the region to deter American 
expansion. In 1846, in the face of increasing American expansionism 
in the west, the Imperial Government in London had deployed a force 
of 347 soldiers of the 6th Regiment of Foot, the Royal Warwickshires, 
to garrison the Lower Fort, near present day Selkirk, Manitoba.58 
Again in 1856, in response to the arrival of US Cavalry near Pembina, 
the Imperial Government dispatched 120 soldiers from the Royal 
Canadian Rifles in St. John’s to Fort Garry via Hudson’s Bay. The 
Rifles remained until 1861.59 
Official American expansionism was not the only threat causing 
consternation amongst the Canadian political leadership. Throughout 
the 1870s and 80s there remained a pervasive fear of military incursions 
by Fenians in both Manitoba and in Ottawa. Rumours of Fenian 
hordes were rife enough in January 1872 that, mere months after the 
initial abortive invasion of Manitoba, several letters to the editor of 
the Manitoba Liberal were penned to express concern. One writer, 
going by the pseudonym “Correspondent” asked “how long may we 
command the services of the brave Volunteers who now protect us?” 
“In a short time their term of service will expire,” he continued, 
“and we will be in as piteous a condition as ever, looking to another 
[US Cavalry officer] Colonel Wheaton for protection – hoping and 
trembling.”60 “Correspondent” went on to suggest the appropriate 
size and constitution of a volunteer militia for the province, with a 
57  Charles P. Stacey, “The Military Aspect of Canada’s Winning of the West, 1870-
1885,” The Canadian Historical Review 21, 1 (1940), 6-7.
58  Frits Pannekoek A Snug Little Flock: The Social Origins of the Riel Resistance of 
1869-70, (Winnipeg: Watson and Dwyer, 1991), 27.
59  “The Royal Canadian Rifles at Fort Garry 1857-1861” in History of the Royal 
Canadian Rifle Regiment, Department of National Defence Directorate of History 
and Heritage Archives, 504.013 (D2), Ottawa, Ontario; George F. G. Stanley, Toil 
and Trouble. Military Expeditions to Red River, (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1989), 
19-52.
60  Manitoba Liberal, “Correspondence” 13 January 1872, 1.
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focus on a cavalry force composed of “sixty or seventy dashing young 
fellows” capable of rapidly deploying to meet interlopers from the 
south and thus “save our families from destruction by ragamuffin 
bands, or, what would still be more terrible, the desecrating hand of 
the religious fanatic.”61 Like their imperial predecessors, the Canadian 
militia volunteers served as a physical manifestation of authority in 
colonial territory, even if a predominantly symbolic one, to both state 
and non-state external aggressors.
stabilizing frontiers
In 1872 Robertson-Ross undertook a tour and inspection of the North-
West of the country at a time when the Dominion Government was 
considering the practicality of maintaining the Provisional Battalion 
in Fort Garry. In his report to the Minister of Militia he pointedly 
observed that, 
No doubt whatever exists in my mind as to the propriety of [maintaining 
a force in Manitoba], in view of the presence of many bands of Indians, 
considering the primitive state of the Province, the strong political party 
feeling which exists, and the fact that on both sides of the International 
Boundary Line restless and reckless characters among both white men 
and Indians abound.62 
Ross’ observations epitomize the security concerns amongst the 
local and federal political leadership and newly-settled citizenry of 
Manitoba from internal political strife, criminals and ne’er-do-wells 
traversing the plains, and the perceived threat of Indigenous bands. 
Security was thus a principal concern for those who were in the 
process of installing a colonial footprint in the North-West. 
Unfortunately, the very presence of Indigenous bands caused 
disquiet amongst settlers and could dissuade immigrants, anathema 
to the strategic goals of the Dominion in the North-West. Take, for 
example, the concern that was raised in the winter and spring of 1873 
in the western reaches of the province. Intelligence was received, and 
61  Ibid.
62  Colonel Robertson-Ross, Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Militia 
Report 1872, (Ottawa: LB Taylor, 1873), cxi.
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confirmed by an emissary from the Indian Department, that a band 
of Sioux on the Little Missouri River led by a man named Little 
Knife intended to raid some part of the province in the spring. The 
concern was most acute in what is now western Manitoba. Archibald 
Macdonald, the chief trader at the Hudson’s Bay Post in Fort Ellice, 
wrote to Donald A. Smith, Member of Parliament and Governor of 
the Hudson’s Bay Company, in January 1873 suggesting that “it will 
be for the benefit of both the Company and the Government that 
troops be sent up here before the end of March.”63 Additionally, in 
March of 1873, the people of Palestine, now known as Gladstone, sent 
a petition to Lieutenant Governor Morris in which they expressed 
concern at the aforementioned intelligence and pleaded with Morris 
to furnish protection, in the form of a hundred soldiers, in order to 
“protect our settlement from being ravaged.” The anonymous author 
went on to lament “I do not understand the policy of the present 
Dominion Government in regard to immigration, but I do not think 
many immigrants will be induced to go farther west unless they 
can see some chance of their lives and property being protected 
[emphasis added].”64
Some contemporaries suggested that the rumours of Indigenous 
bands being on the war path were created by the Hudson’s Bay 
Company to prompt the Dominion Government to deploy soldiers 
to reassure the settlers – soldiers who would require sustainment 
from the only source of provisions in the region, the Hudson’s Bay 
Company. The Free Press, for example, considered the threat of an 
Indigenous uprising overblown, even referring to the situation in print 
as the “Indian Humbug.” The editors reported that “the alarm at 
Ottawa is something most remarkable. Our telegraphic dispatches 
indicate that the Lieut. Governor has started on his return to this 
country, in anticipation of Indian troubles; and, besides, that the 
military force in this country is to be reinforced.”65 (Referring to the 
fourth Red River Expedition that was in the process of organizing.) 
While the editors at the Free Press may have dismissed the 
fears of Indigenous violence as a contrivance, their colleagues at the 
63  “Extract of a letter from Archibald McDonald, Esq., Chief Trader, addressed to 
D.A. Smith, dated 11 February 1873, from Fort Ellice” in Annual Report on Indian 
Affairs for the year ending June 20 1872, Canada Sessional Papers, Volume 5, 1st 
Session, 17.
64  Manitoba Free Press, “Sioux Indians,” 15 March 1873, 5.
65  Manitoba Free Press, “The Indian Humbug” 3 May 1873, 5.
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Manitoban and North-West Herald were more than happy to stoke 
the fires. Two weeks after the Free Press printed their column on the 
“Indian Humbug,” the Herald published an editorial that listed the 
size of U.S. forces garrisoning the west and asked, 
who will say that this array and distribution of force is unnecessary 
in the presence of 60,000 Indians who are impressed with the belief 
that the advancing settlements of whites will disperse the herds of 
buffalo and antelope and appropriate their hunting grounds? With such 
a prospect it is folly not to expect that collisions will not occur, and 
without great prudence and precaution, the inevitable antagonism may 
lead to indescribable horrors of Indian massacre.66 
The threat of Indigenous violence—real or perceived—was sufficient 
to justify the dispatch of fifty militiamen to Fort Ellice to reassure 
the local population.67 On 30 April 1873, Robertson-Ross informed 
Donald A. Smith that he had been instructed by the government to 
dispatch a military force to Fort Ellice with as little delay as possible, 
and that he was authorized to communicate with the Company to 
expedite matters.68 The call for volunteers for a Fourth Red River 
Expedition was made the very next month in May 1873, and the 
expedition arrived in July of that year. 
Clashes with Indigenous peoples on both sides of the border 
exacerbated the concerns of the settlers in Manitoba. Word of the 
defeat of General Terry’s United States Army column during the 
Great Sioux War of 1876, which included the 7th Cavalry under 
Colonel George Custer immortalized by their defeat at Little Big 
Horn, reached Winnipeg at approximately the same time as news 
of the reduction of the Dominion Forces in Winnipeg became public 
knowledge.69 Such an unhappy confluence of events led the editors of 
the Free Press to observe that 
66  Manitoba and Northwest Herald, “Indian Hostilities,” 17 May 1873, 2.
67  Manitoba Free Press, “The Indian Humbug” 3 May 1873, 5.
68   LAC, Correspondence of the General Officer Commanding of the Canadian 
Militia and His Predecessor the Adjutant General, RG 9, Correspondence from the 
Adjutant General of Militia to Donald A. Smith, MP, 30 April 1873, Series II B 1, 
Vol. 543.
69  The Great Sioux War was an attempt by the US Government to pacify the 
Indigenous tribes of the norther mid-west, specifically the Black Hills region of 
modern South Dakota and Wyoming.
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the disaster which has befallen Gen. Terry’s expedition against the 
rebellious Sioux has engendered a doubt as to the possibility of the U.S. 
Government now accomplishing their subjugation during the present 
season, and caused a feeling of some anxiety to be exhibited in Canada 
as to the degree in which the North-West Territories may be affected by 
the course of future events. … To deal with these armed savages, or to be 
prepared to deal with them, it is absolutely necessary that the strength 
of the Dominion forces in the North-West should be augmented.70
Consternations amongst the local population and settlers about 
Indigenous violence, largely overblown and based in racist stereotypes, 
nonetheless demanded the presence of a military garrison to provide 
security in the frontier region. The Canadian militia volunteers 
provided a sense of security and helped to set the conditions for 
European settlement in the region. As the area stabilized, at least 
from the perspective of the European colonizers, the security role 
was taken up by the North-West Mounted Police in 1873, with local 
Active Militia Corps being kept on hand for emergencies. Prior to the 
arrival of the Mounted Police, however, it was the militia garrison 
that ensured law and order in an unruly frontier region.
law and order
While the militia stood as a military deterrent to foreign interlopers 
and a reassuring agent to settlers, they were far more active as an 
agent in aid of the civil power. Aid to Civil Power is a specific type of 
mission performed by military forces in support of local authorities 
for the maintenance of peace, order, and good government. It is an 
enduring element of the Canadian national mythos that the Canadian 
North-West was settled in an orderly and peaceful manner, a view 
deliberately at odds with the more violent experience in the United 
States. To an extent this is true, although lamentably the credit 
for the orderly settlement of the Canadian North-West is too often 
attributed solely to the North-West Mounted Police. Notwithstanding 
the very important role the Mounties played in the maintenance of 
law and order, the role played by the Dominion Forces on Service 
in Manitoba in establishing a lawful, orderly, and settler-friendly 
70  Winnipeg Free Press, “Dominion Forces in the North-West,” 17 July 1876, 2.
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society is little known. Like other regions of Canada, the militia was 
an embryonic police and civil defence force in the North-West that 
set the conditions for British settlement and growth.
The authority for local militia forces to act in such measure was 
articulated in the Militia Act 1868 thusly: 
The Active Militia shall be liable to be called out with their arms and 
ammunition in aid of the Civil Power in case of riot or other emergency 
requiring such services. ... The Officers and men, when so called out, 
shall ... be special constables, and shall be considered to act as such so 
long as they remain so called out.71 
Using militiamen to maintain law and order was commonplace in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century. Militia corps were, in many 
corners of the Dominion, the only public security force available to 
civic leadership. Military historian Desmond Morton has chronicled 
the use of the militia in aid to the civil power. Reflecting on the 
diverse number of threats to public order, Morton observed that 
“in the absence of effective local or provincial police forces, the 
militia were frequently the only available support for magistrates 
confronted by rioting Orangemen or defiant strikers.”72 Today, the 
use of the Canadian military in a law enforcement role is a rarity, but 
it was considered a routine task for the militiamen of the nineteenth 
century. Throughout Canada, both pre- and post-Confederation, the 
military, in the form of British regulars or, later, Canadian militia, 
was used to assist in maintaining social order. Post-Confederation 
Manitoba was no exception.
The question of maintaining law and order in the region was given 
serious thought prior to the departure of the expedition. In a letter 
to the Deputy Minister of Militia dated 19 April 1870, Lieutenant-
General Lindsay mentioned that fifty men from Eastern Canada were 
to be enrolled for a new mounted police force in Manitoba, with 
a goal of recruiting an additional 150 men in Manitoba once the 
71  An Act respecting the Militia and Defence of the Dominion of Canada. 1868, 31 
Victoria, c. 40.
72  Desmond Morton, “Aid to the Civil Power: The Canadian Militia in Support of 
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transfer to Canadian authority was complete.73  This police force, 
however, was to be completely separate from the military expedition, 
and under the command of a Captain Cameron, late of the Royal 
Artillery, who accompanied the Lieutenant Governor-designate, 
William McDougall, to the North-West.74 The planned police force 
never materialized and necessitated the use of the militia to fill the 
void. 
The use of the militia as a tool to ensure peace, order, and 
good government began early in the history of Manitoba. The new 
province was a rough country exacerbated by ubiquitous ethno-
racial tensions. British Army officer Captain George L. Huyshe, who 
chronicled his participation in the Wolseley Expedition in his book, 
The Red River Expedition, recorded that during the short time that 
the British regulars were in Fort Garry, “the place seemed turned 
into a very Pandemonium – Indians, half-breeds, and whites, in all 
stages of intoxication, fighting and quarreling in the streets with 
drawn knives”75 A productive society could not be built on so shaky 
a foundation. 
This state of affairs is unsurprising when one considers that when 
the Wolseley Expedition arrived in Fort Garry, it happened upon a 
society in which law enforcement was almost non-existent. Indeed, 
Alexander Begg and Walter Nursey recount in their history Ten 
Years in Winnipeg that upon the arrival of the Wolseley Expedition, 
Winnipeg had only a single police officer.76 Consequently, the militia 
became agents of social order far more than bulwarks of national 
defence.77
Politically-inspired violence often led to the employment of the 
militia in aid of the civil power. One of the first instances of the use of 
the Militia in such a manner came during the provincial elections of 
73  James Lindsay, “Letter from Lieutenant-General James Lindsay to the Deputy 
Minister of Militia” dated 19 April 1870,  Canadiana Online,  http://online.
canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.91209/2?r=0&s=1, 12 (accessed 29 January 2019).
74  James Lindsay, “Letter from Lieutenant-General the Honourable James Lindsay to 
His Excellency the Governor General” Canadiana Online, http://online.canadiana.
ca/view/oocihm.91209/2?r=0&s=1, 19 (accessed 29 January 2019).
75  Huyshe, The Red River Expedition, 222.
76   Alexander Begg and Walter Nursey, Ten years in Winnipeg. A narration of the 
principal events in the history of the city of Winnipeg from the year A.D. 1870 to 
the year A.D. 1879, inclusive, (Winnipeg: Times Printing and Publishing House, 
1879), 15.
77  Morton, “Aid to the Civil Power,” 407.
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19 September 1872 when a mob assembled in Winnipeg, worked into 
fervour by inflammatory rhetoric from the hustings. A requisition 
signed by three magistrates for a force of seventy-five soldiers was 
immediately filled by the Acting Deputy Adjutant-General Major 
Irvine, Osborne Smith being absent on leave in Eastern Canada. The 
mob grew violent and was intent on burning the Dominion Savings 
Bank to the ground, and while they were able to smash a few windows, 
the militia guard arrived in time to prevent the mob from setting the 
bank alight. Unfortunately, local printing shops, particularly those 
supportive of the Provisional Government of Louis Riel, did not fare 
so well and many were severely damaged, their printers smashed. As 
the mob became emboldened by drink, another attempt was made 
to assault the Dominion Savings Bank where a small guard was 
maintained by the militia after the initial confrontation earlier in 
the day. Happily, the battalion diarist recorded, in response to the 
advancing mob the orders “Guard turn out and fix bayonets proved 
too great a barrier [emphasis added].”78 The mob retreated.
In 1873 the provincial legislature was prorogued in disarray after 
an attempt to incorporate the City of Winnipeg was stymied by what 
some considered the interference of the Hudson’s Bay Company. It 
was presumed amongst the aggrieved that the Company feared the 
impact of municipal taxes that would accompany incorporation. The 
ill-will was substantial enough that the Speaker of the Legislature, 
Dr. Bird, was “decoyed from his residence on the pretence of being 
called to see a patient, and when near Point Douglas he was taken 
forcibly from his cutter, and a pail of hot tar thrown over his face, 
head and shoulders.”79 In response to this and in order to “frustrate 
the carrying into execution threats freely circulated by citizens to 
set fire to the buildings” the Provisional Battalion was requested to 
post a guard of fourteen soldiers on the Parliament Buildings, while 
another force of soldiers was maintained at the ready in Fort Garry, 
should they be required at short notice.80
Later in 1873, the militia was requested to send a detachment 
of soldiers to White Horse Plains, which lays thirty kilometers west 
of Winnipeg, where a quizzical confrontation between Mennonites, 
78  Journal of the Provisional Battalion of Rifles at Fort Garry, 1871.
79  Begg and Nursey, Ten Years in Winnipeg, 80.
80  Osborne-Smith, Militia Report 1873, (Ottawa: LB Taylor, 1874), 36; Journal of 
the Provisional Battalion of Rifles at Fort Garry, 1871.
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teamsters, and Métis had turned violent. As the story is related in 
the Free Press, a group of Mennonites were traveling in carts across 
the prairie when a Métis horseman passed nearby and struck one of 
the horses. In retaliation, one of the teamsters driving the cart struck 
the Métis with his whip. Tempers flared, and the Métis returned with 
a pistol but was fortunately pre-empted from violence by some of his 
colleagues. Nonetheless, the Mennonites and their teamsters stopped 
in at a local hotel for respite. Shortly thereafter the same Métis 
gentleman arrived, and the argument began anew, after which the 
same teamster roughed up the Métis. This did not aid in calming the 
situation, and soon a large group of the Métis gentleman’s colleagues 
arrived at the hotel, armed and in a foul mood. Tempers flared to 
the point that the pacifistic Mennonites holed themselves up on the 
second floor of the hotel, and a request was expedited to Fort Garry 
for assistance. A detachment of fifty soldiers was dispatched from 
Fort Garry, accompanied by the Judge of the Queen’s Bench and the 
Attorney General of the Province, to arrest the Métis.81 The soldiers 
arrested a party of five Métis and marched them back to prison while 
escorting the Mennonites into Winnipeg.
Protecting the local prison became a routine task for the militia on 
station in Winnipeg. In July of 1873, Osborne Smith furnished another 
force of men to retain two Americans, Messrs. Hoy and Keegan, who 
had been incarcerated and were awaiting trial on serious criminal 
charges, namely the kidnapping of a notorious character named 
“Gordon.” There was some concern about flight of the accused, or 
rescue by their confederates, necessitating the militia guard.82 Later, 
Ambrose Lepine, alleged murderer of Thomas Scott during the era of 
the Provisional Government of Assiniboia under Louis Riel, was also 
incarcerated in Fort Garry and the militia were asked to provide a 
force to both retain him in custody and prevent locals from taking the 
law into their own hands. The incident is recorded in the Battalion’s 
Journal thusly: “On one or two occasions threats were made in the 
presence of the guard to lynch the prisoner, the mob displaying ropes, 
but cold steel had a wonderful effect in dispersing the crowd, as the 
guard merely fixed swords and remained steady.”83
81  Manitoba Free Press, ‘Arrests by the Military’, 5 July 1873, 5; Journal of the 
Provisional Battalion of Rifles at Fort Garry, 1871.
82  Osborne-Smith, Militia Report 1873, (Ottawa: LB Taylor, 1874), 36.
83  Journal of the Provisional Battalion of Rifles in Fort Garry, 1871.
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While the Militia provided a formed body of troops to conduct 
policing duties, one must not overlook the first police force in Winnipeg 
was drawn exclusively from the ranks of the Militia garrison. Captain 
Villiers of the Quebec Rifles organized the first police force that 
consisted of nineteen soldiers of the Militia. Begg and Nursey 
recorded that “almost every day [Villiers] could be seen drilling his 
recruits in front of the Davis House.”84 Villiers was succeeded by 
another volunteer from the Militia, Louis Fasse de Plainval who 
even went to the lengths of travelling to Montreal to interview Police 
Force authorities there and learn practices that might work well in 
Winnipeg.85 Additionally, Captain Edward Armstrong, who came to 
Fort Garry as the Quarter Master of the 1st Ontario Rifles and 
later served as the Quarter Master of the Provisional Battalion, was 
appointed as Sherriff of the Province of Manitoba in 1872, a post he 
held until 1876.86
When the North-West Mounted Police was formed in 1873, 
unsurprisingly former Militia garrison men such as Major A.G. Irvine 
and Captain Herchmer were to be found in its ranks.87 Moreover, 
Osborne Smith was named the first, albeit temporary, Commandant 
of the force and did much of the early planning and organization to 
ensure the later success of the Mounties.88
men behaving badly
Inasmuch as the Militia garrison provided a force for the establishment 
of law and order, in many ways it was also, ironically, a key source 
of the violence and crime that pervaded early Winnipeg. Despite 
what, on the surface, may have been valorous and dutiful service to 
84  Begg and Nursey, Ten Years in Winnipeg, 15; Shore, The Canadians and the 
Métis, 170.
85  “Montreal,” Volunteer Review, 6 (47) , 9.
86  Letter from the Adjutant General of Militia to Captain Armstrong dated 21 
February 1872, LAC, RG 9, II B1, Volume 518; “Memorable Manitobans: Edward 
Armstrong,” Manitoba Historical Society (MHS) Website, , http://www.mhs.mb.ca/
docs/people/armstrong_e.shtml. (accessed 27 July 2017)
87  “Memorable Manitobans: Louis Fasse Plainval,” MHS Website, http://www.mhs.
mb.ca/docs/people/plainval_ln.shtml (accessed 21 January 2019); Manitoba Free 
Press, “Local and Provincial”, 5 August 1876, 2.
88  Ernest Chambers, The Royal North-West Mounted Police. A Corps History, 
(Montreal: The Mortimer Press, 1896), 19, 160.
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the country, in many cases the conduct of the Militia volunteers was 
abysmal. The force encountered the usual variations from good order 
and discipline that are common amongst any large military body, 
but unfortunately its ranks were also home to those who would 
employ violence and intimidation to achieve their goal of an Anglo-
protestant society in the North-West at the expense of the Métis.
conduct unbecoming
The general crime and misdemeanours of the militia was varied and 
common to military forces, particularly those deployed in remote 
areas with little in the way of entertainment to keep young hands 
and minds occupied. Life as a solider garrisoning a town on the edge 
of what was considered by contemporaries to be “civilized” terrain 
was rote and boring. Justus Griffin, who deployed to Fort Garry 
with the Second Red Expedition, recalled that once he arrived in 
Manitoba his life became “the same dreary round of duties and few 
changes of scenery and few incidents to interest and occupy the 
mind, the arrival of mails from home being the only interesting event 
perhaps for weeks.”89 The readily available supply of intoxicants did 
not help. Charges against soldiers for drunkenness increased from 
56 in 1870 to 470 in 1873, absence without leave increased five-fold 
from 99 to 500 in the same time period, and the number of instances 
of involvement of Police or Civilians in occasions of military crime 
likewise increased from 29 to 112.90 
General assault seemed also to be a favourite pass time. For 
example, on Christmas Eve, 1873, Mr. J.J. Johnston was driving his 
cutter through the city when he was stopped by two soldiers, one 
of whom took hold of the horse while the other made to strike Mr. 
Johnston, presumably to steal the sleigh. Fortunately, a witness in a 
local saloon came to the man’s rescue brandishing a unique type of 
sabre, a pool cue, and chased the volunteers off.91 While Mr. Johnston 
escaped with his life, James A. Brown was not so lucky. In June of 
1874, Gunner Michaud and Corporal Baker got into an argument 
after a night of alcoholic excess in the taverns of Winnipeg and Mr. 
89  Griffin, From Toronto to Fort Garry, 53, 56-60.
90  Shore, The Canadians and the Métis, 287.
91  Manitoba Free Press, 27 December 1873, 5.
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Brown had innocently stumbled upon them during their fisticuffs and 
attempted to break up the fight. Michaud turned on the unfortunate 
Good Samaritan and horribly assaulted him with a knife, leaving 
him to die in the street. The post-mortem was conducted by Dr. 
Turvers during which the body was found to have a great number 
of wounds, no less than 33. These included three cuts to the throat, 
eight skull fractures, two knife wounds into the skull that penetrated 
into the brain, and at least one knife wound that penetrated deep into 
the right lung.92 When Gunner Michaud sobered up, he confessed to 
the murder saying “[Je suis] coupable dans mon cœur et je mérite le 
mort.”93 In a legacy that the Militia authorities probably did not want 
to leave, in August 1874 Gunner Michaud was hanged in the yard of 
the city court house and thus became the first person to be executed 
by the state in Winnipeg.94
the process of intimidation
More pernicious than these admittedly disturbing crimes was the 
racially-based violence designed to intimidate local Métis. Frederick 
Shore posits in his doctoral thesis for the University of Manitoba, The 
Canadians and the Metis: The Re-Creation of Manitoba 1858-1872 
that while some of the volunteers’ misbehaviour was simply the result 
of poor discipline, much of it was calculated with unsavoury intent. 
From an official perspective, the Wolseley Expedition was intended 
to be a peacekeeping force. Contrarily, Shore concludes that amongst 
the militia volunteers who filled the ranks of the Ontario and Quebec 
Battalions – particularly although not exclusively the former – there 
was an unofficial mission within the Red River Expeditionary Force 
to employ a “Kansas-style influx of armed settlers whose purpose 
was to guarantee that the new Province of Manitoba assumed an 
Ontario image without the interference of the Métis.”95 Shore refers 
to this as the process of intimidation.96
92  Manitoba Free Press, “Murder!,” 20 June 1874, 5.
93  Nor’Wester, “The Execution,” 31 August 1874, 1.
94  Manitoba Free Press, “Michaud’s Execution,” 29 August 1874, 7.
95  Shore, The Canadians and the Métis, 217.
96  Ibid., 217-18.
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The list of transgressions perpetrated by militia volunteers 
against Métis are too partisan in nature to casually dismiss as 
routine soldierly steam-venting. In a paper prepared for the Louis 
Riel Institute entitled “The Reign of Terror against the Métis of 
Red River,” Lawrence Barkwell, the Coordinator of Métis History 
and Heritage Research, articulated a profoundly upsetting list of 
volunteer violence that clearly illustrates a partisan bias and targeting 
of Métis and their sympathisers.97 Moreover, Métis were not alone in 
suffering the intimidation of the volunteers – French Catholics were 
also considered legitimate targets of the soldiers who aimed to impose 
an Anglophone protestant cultural hegemony on the new province. 
The list is too extensive to share in full here, but a sampling of 
the events will demonstrate the extent of volunteer intimidation. 
Unfortunately, in many instances, whether for a lack of vigour in the 
investigation, or perhaps a legitimate lack of evidence, many of the 
alleged perpetrators were never brought to justice.
The litany of sins is long: In September of 1870, John Shultz, 
leader of the pro-Canada party during the Resistance, broke into the 
home of Thomas Spence, the editor of the New Nation, a newspaper 
created by Louis Riel after he amalgamated the Nor’ Wester and he 
Red River Pioneer, horsewhipped him, and then broke into his office, 
scattered his staff and destroyed the printing press.98 In September 
of 1870, James Ross, who was representative of the English Métis 
and was also a member of the Provisional Government under Riel, 
had his home burnt to the ground in an act of arson. In November 
of 1870, a man named Landry was set upon by 12-15 soldiers, had a 
rope tied around his neck and was dragged for about a hundred feet 
before the police were brought to the scene – the soldiers claiming 
they wanted revenge for the death of Thomas Scott. 
Louis Riel and his family were specific targets of the volunteer 
intimidation. In December of 1871, a group of discharged Expeditionary 
Force men burst into Riel’s home claiming to have a warrant for his 
arrest. He was not home at the time, and the brigands resorted to 
97  Lawrence Barkwell, “The Reign of Terror Against the Metis of Red River.” Virtual 
Museum of Metis History and Culture accessed 25 January 2019,  http://www.
metismuseum.ca/resource.php/149078..
98  John W. Dafoe, “Early Winnipeg Newspapers: The Last 70 Years of Journalism 
at Fort Garry and Winnipeg” MHS Transactions, Series 3, 1956-57, MHS 
Website, accessed 12 June 2017, http://www.mhs.mb.ca/docs/transactions/3/
earlywinnipegnewspapers.shtml.
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threatening the women by holding guns to their heads and demanding 
to know Riel’s whereabouts. One member vowed that Riel would be 
dead by the end of the evening. This act was disagreeable enough to 
motivate several citizens to write a petition to the Lieutenant-Governor 
asking him to take steps to ensure such atrocities did not repeat. 
Perhaps most grievous was the assault and subsequent murder 
of Elzear Goulet, a Métis who was involved in the execution of 
Thomas Scott. Goulet had been one of the staunchest supporters 
of Riel during the resistance which consequently made him one of 
the most despised inhabitants of Red River amongst the virulently 
pro-Canada partisans. He remained in Fort Garry after the arrival 
of the Wolseley Expedition, while many of his colleagues fled. Joseph 
Alfred Mousseau remarked in an October 1870 edition of l’Opinion 
Publique, that “depuis l’arrivée des troupes, il était reste au milieu 
des métis français, se gardant bien de s’aventurer sur le territoire 
ennemi.”99 In September of 1870, Goulet reportedly accepted a job 
as a guide for a Mr. Cunningham from Toronto. Goulet crossed from 
St. Boniface and was recognized by what Mousseau referred to as 
“un parent de l’un des prisonniers de Riel au Fort Garry.”100 He was 
then set upon by some volunteers – originating from la vertueuse 
Province sœur, as Mousseau sarcastically referred to Ontario, and 
fled his assaulters by bolting for St. Boniface.101 He attempted to 
swim the Red River to evade his pursuers, but they pelted him 
with rocks as he swam, one rock striking him on the head, and he 
eventually drowned. No punishment was ever meted out to any of 
those involved.102 Compounding the tragedy, his daughter, Laurette 
was allegedly raped by members of the Red River Expeditionary 
Force and died of her injuries.103
conclusion
As odd as it may feel to consider Canada an imperial power that 
colonized the North-West in the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
99  Joseph-Alfred Mousseau, “Goulet” in L’Opinion Publique, 1 (41), 2.
100  Ibid., 2.
101  Ibid., 2
102  Shore, The Canadians and the Métis, 230-32.
103  Barkwell, “the Reign of Terror…”, 11.
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the parallels between the actions of the Dominion in Rupert’s Land 
and Great Britain globally are undeniable. This is particularly true 
when considering the role played by the Canadian militia garrison 
maintained in Manitoba from 1870 to 1877, an interesting and 
enlightening chapter of Canadian military history that is lamentably 
unexplored. 
Born of the Red River Expeditionary Force sent, ostensibly, 
as a peacekeeping force in reaction to the Red River Resistance of 
1869-70, the Dominion Forces on Service in Manitoba garrisoned the 
newly acquired peripheral colony in order to set the conditions for 
the successful settlement and exploitation of the region by the central 
Canadian metropole. The garrison, whose numbers waxed and waned 
over the years in response to both real and perceived security threats, 
fulfilled the three critical military objectives of a colonial garrison. 
It provided a military deterrent, albeit predominantly symbolic in 
nature, to state and non-state external aggression from the American 
Republic to the south. It provided a military reserve for use in 
stabilizing the frontier for settlement when European and Canadian 
settlers felt trepidations, largely based on racist stereotypes, about 
local Indigenous bands. Finally, in the rough and tumble frontier 
region where no law enforcement agency existed to maintain peace, 
order and good government, at least until the creation of the North-
West Mounted Police, the militia garrison provided aid to the civil 
power to ensure law and order in the region. 
Despite these seemingly beneficial acts, one must not fall into the 
trap of blind lionization of the militia volunteers. Many came west 
with a racial and cultural agenda, to ensure Anglo-protestant cultural 
supremacy in the new colony at the expense of its inhabitants. The 
soldiers often resorted to off-duty violence in a process of intimidation 
against the Métis of the region which contributed mightily to the 
latter’s displacement westward and the regrettable abandonment of 
their traditional homeland. 
The story of the Canadian garrison in Manitoba is deserving of 
further investigation. It may lack the excitement of battle narrative, 
it occurred in an isolated post far from the economic and political 
focus of the country, and its timeline is relatively short. Nonetheless, 
the militia volunteers in Manitoba made a distinct impact, for good 
or ill, on the evolution of Canadian society and the growth of the 
Canadian nation.
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